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[1693] 
Unmasking Mullane:  
Due Process, Common Trust Funds, and the 
Class Action Wars 
John Leubsdorf* 
Although Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) is a 
classic Civil Procedure case, its history has never before been written. This Article reveals 
that history, traced among other sources, in the papers of New York’s Governor Herbert 
Lehman, whose misgivings did not prevent his signing the legislation that the Supreme 
Court struck down, and of Justice Robert Jackson, who wrote the opinion striking it 
down. More or less behind the scenes, two struggles were going on. One involved and 
prefigured all of the tensions of the modern class action: conflicts within the class, the 
relative functions of notice and adequate representation, the attempt to secure “global 
peace” by binding nonparticipants, and more. The other struggle concerned the efforts of 
trust companies to enlarge their turf and get into the investment business while barring 
liability to their customers. The due process holding for which we remember Mullane 
thus emerged from and glossed over deeper and more particularized conflicts. This 
Article explores both the history and the contemporary relevance of Mullane. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School—Newark. Many thanks to Kevin Clermont, Martha 
Minow, David Noll, Judith Resnik, and Stephen Yeazell for their help. 
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Introduction 
Although Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.1 is a 
standard Civil Procedure case, its history has never before been written. 
This Article reveals that history, traced among other sources, in the 
papers of New York Governor Herbert Lehman, whose misgivings did 
not prevent his signing the legislation that the Supreme Court struck 
down, and of Justice Robert Jackson, who wrote the opinion striking it 
down. More or less behind the scenes, two struggles were going on. One 
involved and prefigured all the tensions of the modern class action. The 
other struggle concerned trust companies’ efforts to enlarge their turf 
and get into the investment business while barring liability to their 
customers. The due process holding for which we remember Mullane 
thus emerged from and glossed over deeper and more particularized 
conflicts.  
Mullane has become the leading case on the notice that due process 
requires in civil actions,2 but it can be understood more realistically as a 
class action disguised as a trust accounting proceeding. The Central 
Hanover Bank (“Central Hanover”) sought a judgment that it committed 
no wrong in running pooled trusts, a judgment that would bind all the 
beneficiaries of the trusts and would prevent them from challenging its 
conduct in future litigation. It tried to obtain this judgment without 
notifying the trust beneficiaries except by publishing a newspaper 
announcement, only to be instructed by the Supreme Court that due 
process required notice by mail to every beneficiary whose name and 
 
 1. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 2. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006). 
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address appeared in the Central Hanover’s records. The Court thus 
established both that notice was required and that a binding judgment 
could nevertheless be entered without sending even informal notice to 
every beneficiary.  
Mullane’s compromise notice requirement—sending a letter to all 
class members whose names and addresses are known—is an 
indispensable foundation for every damages class action that seeks to 
include more than a list of specified class members.3 That includes the 
great majority of class actions.4 Other issues that have bedeviled class 
actions were also lurking under the surface of Mullane: Does class action 
notice benefit those notified, or their opponents who seek to bind them 
to the result of the action?5 Are the interests of class members sufficiently 
aligned so that some may protect the interests of others?6 Will the 
lawyers purporting to speak for the class instead pursue their own 
interests?7 All these questions were raised in Mullane. And Mullane 
could also be seen as an instance of the courts’ unwillingness to address 
such questions when that might upset a quick and cheap resolution of the 
cases before them. 
From another perspective, the history of the common trust funds 
considered in Mullane offers an intriguing example of how notice and 
representation requirements work or fail to work in one institutional 
context. Notice and representation are central both in Mullane and in the 
law of class actions. But what good does each of them do? When 
considering how to resolve disputes, we usually take for granted the 
traditional forms of litigation, but when it comes to setting up a new 
business arrangement, different forms of protection and participation 
may be preferable. The history of the common trust fund takes place in a 
conflicted area between the traditional trust, an institution responsible to 
a court of equity, and something more like a publicly owned corporation. 
In Mullane, those models pointed in different directions, and history, or 
at least the financial industry, ultimately followed the corporate rather 
than the courtroom model. 
Viewing the case in these different contexts can help us demystify 
what might be called the myth of Mullane. Many cases that are most 
 
 3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974). The extent to which notice is 
constitutionally required, especially in class actions seeking only collective injunctive relief, remains 
unclear. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–59 (2011). 
 4. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, Federal Judicial Center (2008). 
 5. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97 (1974).  
 6. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622–28 (1997); see also Deborah L. 
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183 (1982). 
 7. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852–55 (1999); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976). 
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commonly remembered as establishing broad legal principles turn out, 
upon closer examination, to be unique responses to particular situations.8 
Mullane is cited for the principle that due process requires practical 
notice. But in real life the case represented an effort to reconcile the 
protection of trust beneficiaries in an era that still remembered the 
investment abuses of the 1920s with what was considered a new and 
progressive banking method for those without great wealth. That 
reconciliation was effected through a complex interplay among rulings of 
which the notice holding was only one part. 
This study, after very briefly describing Mullane in Part I, will trace 
in Part II the history of the statute under which the case arose, showing 
the various motives of its proponents and opponents, as revealed in part 
by Governor Lehman’s private files. We will see how trust companies, 
reaching out for new business, sought to navigate around Depression-era 
suspicions of banks and investment companies by appealing to New Deal 
concern for small investors. In particular, it will appear that the New 
York statutory provisions for binding accountings that were before the 
Supreme Court were not necessary—other states did without them—and 
were included by the trust companies in the hope of reducing their own 
exposure to beneficiary suits. They sought to enter the riskier world of 
investment companies while barring liability to their customers. And yet, 
the banks may have wrought a bit better than they meant: accountings 
have turned out to be a modest safeguard for beneficiaries lacking in 
those other states.  
Turning to the Mullane litigation itself, Part III will explore the 
adequacy of Kenneth Mullane’s representation of the trust beneficiaries 
he was appointed to represent, look for conflicting interests among those 
beneficiaries, and consider why the different judges involved in the case 
approached it as they did. The private papers of Justice Jackson cast new 
light on what was going on behind the scenes. It turns out that three 
Supreme Court Justices initially opposed the decision, which helps 
explain some puzzling features of Justice Jackson’s opinion. Finally, this 
Article will survey the impact of Mullane on common trust funds and 
examine the operation of statutory accountings and other safeguards 
over subsequent decades. 
I.  MULLANE in a Pinhead 
In 1937, New York passed a statute authorizing trust companies to 
pool small trust funds into a larger common trust fund, thus making it 
possible to diversify trust investments and perhaps to reduce administrative 
costs. Instead of having to find a prudent investment for, say, $5000 placed 
in trust under a will, the trustee could use $200,000 coming from many 
 
 8. See, e.g., A.W. Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (1995).  
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such trusts to create a balanced portfolio. A trust company sponsoring 
such a common trust fund was subject to requirements imposed by 
statute, by New York’s Banking Board and federal authorities, and by 
fiduciary law. One statutory requirement was that the trust company 
conduct regular accountings, which, when approved by the court, would 
bind all beneficiaries of the pooled trusts as to any matter set forth in the 
account.9  
To give notice of each accounting, the trust company was required 
to publish four weekly newspaper advertisements that did not name 
individual beneficiaries. The beneficiaries received no individual notice 
of the proceeding, but when funds from their trusts were first invested in 
the common trust fund, a notification and a copy of the common trust 
fund statute were mailed to beneficiaries. To further protect the 
beneficiaries, two guardians ad litem were to be appointed on behalf, 
respectively, of those with an interest in the trust principal and those with 
an interest in trust income. Also, during each accounting, the 
superintendent of banking was required to submit to the court a report 
on the legality of the common trust fund’s investments.10 
Kenneth Mullane, a lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem for the 
income beneficiaries in an accounting for a common trust fund 
established by the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 
challenged the constitutional validity of a judgment purporting to bind 
beneficiaries who received no notice of the proceeding. Rebuffed in the 
New York state courts, Mullane’s challenge succeeded in the Supreme 
Court, which found that the proceeding denied beneficiaries due 
process.11  
Justice Jackson’s opinion rejected the argument that personal 
service was required because the proceeding should be considered as in 
personam. The opinion relied on recent precedents treating the due 
process requirement as one of notice reasonably likely to reach the party 
in question rather than one of formal service,12 and Justice Jackson noted 
that beneficiaries who received notice could be expected to protect the 
interests they shared with those who did not.13 Indeed, the opinion held 
that the Central Hanover had no obligation to undergo the “practical 
 
 9. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law §§ 100-c (1), (6), & (10)). For 
federal regulation, see infra text at notes 73–75, 239–242. 
 10. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (6)). 
 11. The constitutional claim was first raised and rejected in an interlocutory motion. In re Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sur. Ct. 1947), aff’d, 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1948), 
appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949). It was raised and rejected again, 
without additional judicial opinions, on appeal from the trial court’s final decree. In re Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 87 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1949), rev’d sub nom. 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
 12. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (citing inter alia Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); 
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18–20 (1928)). 
 13. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.  
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difficulties and costs” of locating beneficiaries whose names and addresses 
it did not already possess.14 As to those beneficiaries, service by publication 
would suffice because the expense of doing more might destroy the 
advantages of the common trust fund scheme.15 
Having thus pared away the more costly aspects of notice—personal 
service and search costs—Justice Jackson was able to impose on Central 
Hanover the cheaper alternative of sending letters to those beneficiaries 
whose identity and location were known.16 Central Hanover was already 
mailing them their checks, and had already sent them information about 
the common trust fund. In the era of the three-cent stamp, sending a few 
hundred more letters17 was not an excessive burden. While subsequent 
increases in the size of classes have made notice considerably more 
expensive,18 they have also increased the potential impact of accountings or 
class actions. 
II.  Legislating the Common Trust Fund 
In 1937, when the New York statute at issue in Mullane was awaiting 
signature or veto in the governor’s office, someone scribbled on it, 
“Important billI feel little frightened by it.”19 That someone may have 
been Governor Herbert Lehman who, as a long-time former partner of 
Lehman Brothers and a trustee for numerous family trusts,20 might well 
have been interested by a statute affecting both trust companies and 
trustees. It would be nice to think that he reviewed statutes so 
conscientiously. Alternatively, the scribbler may have been his trusted 
counsel Charles Poletti.21 Somehow the fear was assuaged, perhaps as 
suggested by a reply scribble, by talking with the Superintendent of 
 
 14. Id. at 317. 
 15. Id. at 317–18.  
 16. Id. at 318–20. 
 17. See id. at 309 (noting that 113 trusts participated in the common trust fund). There was 
testimony that there were about 350 current beneficiaries, and perhaps between 1000 and 2000 persons 
with relevant interests. Transcript of Record at 42, 49–50, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (No. 378). There were larger funds but they were outside New York and 
hence not subject to New York’s account procedures. Id. at 54. 
 18. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974) (estimating cost of $400,000 
for class action notice). But see Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped 
Potential of the Internet, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 727, 730–34 (2008) (advocating for greater use of Internet 
notice). 
 19. File of Governor’s Office on 1937 N.Y. Laws 1565 (microformed in New York State Library, 
Legislative Reference Section, Bill Jacket Collection) [hereinafter Governor’s File]. 
 20. Robert P. Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York’s Little New Deal 4, 8 (1975); 
Letter from Edgar Bernheimer to Allan S. Lehman (Nov. 21, 1933) (on file with The Lehman 
Collections, Columbia University). 
 21. Poletti is the addressee of several letters in the Governor’s File. He later became a judge, the 
Lieutenant Governor, and for a few days, the Governor of New York, as well as filling other important 
positions. Ingalls, supra note 20, at 13 (describing Poletti as “a one-man brain trust”); Richard 
Goldstein, Charles Poletti Dies at 99; Aided War-Ravaged Italy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2002, at A11. 
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Banking, William R. White, who was pushing the proposed statute.22 In 
any event, Governor Lehman did sign the bill. 
What was so frightening or so important about common trust funds? 
They appear in the Mullane opinion as a modest and beneficent 
development in the ancient art of trusteeship, which is how the banks 
promoting them wished them to be perceived. Yet the New York statute 
was opposed by two committees of the New York County Lawyers’ 
Association23 and approved despite criticism of “somewhat serious 
defects” by a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York.24 Meanwhile the judges of the New York County Surrogate’s Court 
stood neutral.25  
Examination of the banks’ concerns and justifications, and the fears 
they had to overcome to secure authorizing legislation, reveals that the 
problem aired in Mullanebinding many parties in a single judicial 
proceedingwas a superficial manifestation of the problem of including 
many trusts in a common trust fund. Establishing such a fund means that 
the beneficiaries of all the participating trusts will be subject to the 
investment decisions of the sponsoring bank. Of course, exactly this 
happens when many stockholders invest in a corporation and are 
consequently bound by decisions of its board of directors. If one 
compares a common trust fund to a corporation, it is hard to see what the 
fuss was about, though it is true that the beneficiarieslike class action 
membershad not consented to be incorporated in a mass entity. 
But if one compares a common trust fund to the situation existing 
before it was created, in which each participating trust had its own 
beneficiaries with significant rights against the trustees, beneficiaries 
could be seen as facing the possible loss both of procedural rights and of 
the rights traditionally enforced by courts of equity to have the trust 
corpus managed solely for the purposes of their particular trust. In effect, 
beneficiaries were being moved from trust law nearer to corporation law, 
 
 22. Under the words quoted in the text accompanying note 19, someone wrote: “If you feel 
uncertain, why not have White come to Albany to discuss it?” Letter from William R. White, 
Superintendent of Banking, to Charles Poletti, Counsel for Herbert Lehman (May 27, 1939) (on file 
with the Governor’s File) (replying to objections to the bill, and offering to come to Albany to discuss 
it with the Governor).  
 23. Letter of Irving J. Joseph, Comm. on the Surrogate’s Court (May 13, 1937) (on file with the 
Governor’s File); Substitute Report No. 455, Comm. on State Legislation (Apr. 28, 1937) (on file with 
the Governor’s File). 
 24. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legislation, Bulletin 14, at 855, 858 
(May 18–25, 1937). 
 25. Letter of Richard Cumming (May 27, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). But see 
Memorandum of James A. Delehanty (May 10, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File) (stating that 
the surrogate courts approved the legislation). The Legislative Committees of the Schenectady and 
Genesee County Bar Associations approved the statute. Memorandum of N.Y. State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 
8, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). Of course, these counties played a far smaller role in trust 
administration than did New York County. 
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just as class members are moved from a proceeding in which the plaintiff 
is “master of his claim”26 to a mass production remedy controlled by class 
counsel and the court.27 
A. The Movement for Common Trust Funds 
The 1920s brought challenges for trust companies. Inexperienced 
investors entered the market for common stocks, lured by investment 
companies promising the benefits of diversification and professional 
management.28 Trusts, meanwhile, were often still limited to their 
traditional investments in mortgages, government bonds, and high-quality 
industrial bonds,29 of which only the first was likely to provide high returns. 
When a trust was small, adequate diversification was out of reach. Though 
the market for trust services might have been expanding, trust companies 
faced increasing competition from national banks.30 
So trust companies began experimenting with diversification schemes. 
In some states it was already possible to divide a single mortgage among 
several trusts,31 either to share the risk or to make it possible for trusts 
with few assets to invest in mortgages as well as bonds. The next step was 
to make it possible for a trust to invest in a pool of mortgages,32 further 
reducing the risk—though not by any means eliminating it, as we learned 
again in 2007.33 And a few institutions set up common trust funds whose 
investments were not limited to mortgages.34 
“With the collapse of the mortgage-loan market during the . . . 
[1929] depression, the mortgage pool and single mortgage participation 
types of investment became greatly discredited.”35 Not that the few common 
 
 26. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 27. For the classic discussion, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 
73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (1998). 
 28. 2 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States: From J.P. Morgan to the 
Institutional Investor (1900–1970) 123–43 (2002); S.E.C., Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., pt. 1, at 35–65 (1938). 
 29. See Restatement of Trusts § 227 cmt. f, n (1935); 1 Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise on the 
Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 452, 456, 458 (6th ed. 1911); Symposium, The Investment of Trust 
Funds, 5 Law & Contemp. Probs. 335 (1938). 
 30. Eugene N. White, Banking Innovation in the 1920s: The Growth of National Banks’ Financial 
Services, 13 Bus. & Econ. Hist. 92, 93, 95–98 (1984). 
 31. In re Union Trust Co., 114 N.E. 1057 (N.Y. 1916); Frank C. McKinney, Legality of 
Participating Mortgage Certificates as Investments for Trustees, 24 Yale L.J. 286 (1914). 
 32. G. Fred Berger, Pooling or Participation Mortgages as Investments for Trust Funds, 48 Tr. Co. 
599 (1929); Comment, Participation Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investment by Corporate 
Fiduciaries, 45 Yale L.J. 857 (1936). 
 33. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 Geo. L.J. 
1177 (2012). 
 34. James J. Saxon & Dean E. Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994, 995–99 (1965). 
 35. C.A.W., Jr., Note, Commingled Investment by Corporate Fiduciaries in Pennsylvania, 
87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577, 579 (1939).  
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trust funds did much better.36 In any event, it was to common trust funds 
that the trust companies turned in an effort to maintain their share of 
what was now a disillusioned but still desirable market. 
In 1934, the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association set 
up the Special Committee on Common Trust Funds, which proceeded to 
seek the adoption of common trust fund legislation.37 By 1941, eleven 
states had authorizing statutes, and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had promulgated a Uniform 
Common Trust Fund Statute.38  
Although the benefits of diversifying investments constituted a 
major argument for common trust fund legislation,39 the bankers also 
struck a New Deal note by asserting that they were protecting the little 
guy by reducing administrative costs.40 They relied on “the social 
obligation they owe to all people who need trust service whether their 
estates are large or small.”41 Indeed, some claimed that they were 
administering small trusts at a loss, as a sort of public service.42 Bankers 
disagreed as to how introducing common trust funds would affect this 
situation. Some thought that the innovation would actually increase 
administrative expenses by adding complex record-keeping requirements.43 
This may explain why, as we shall see, trust companies did not rush to take 
advantage of the legislation once it was passed.44 Others foresaw substantial 
 
 36. S.E.C., Investment Trusts and Investment Companies 20–24 (1939) (reporting substantial 
declines in value from 1929 to 1936, though not out of line with those registered by stock and bond 
indexes); see also Note, The Common Trust Fund StatutesA Legalization of Commingling, 
37 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1385 (1937) (asserting that holders of straight mortgage participations did no 
worse than mortgagees as a class, and that “the real debacle occurred” with mortgage participation 
certificates in mortgage pools).  
 37. B. Magruder Wingfield, Reappraisal of Common Trust Fund, 25 Tr. Bull. 10 (1946); 
C. Alexander Capron, The Federal Reserve Board Regulations of Common Trust Funds, 5 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 439, 440 (1938). 
 38. Development of Common Trust Funds in the United States: Establishment and Public Relations 
Approach, 72 Tr. & Est. 367 (1941). The eight statutes in effect in 1939 may be found in Securities and 
Exchange Commission. See S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–52. 
 39. E.g., Revenue Act of 1936, Hearings Before the S. Finance Comm., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 789–
90 (1936) (statement of Gilbert T. Stevenson, Trust Division, American Bankers Association); 
C.A.W., Jr., supra note 35, at 578. 
 40. Supra note 37; Merrel P. Callaway, Problems of the Trust Division of the American Bankers 
Association, 63 Tr. Co. 280, 284 (1936). 
 41. Hearings, supra note 39, at 794 (memorandum submitted by Gilbert T. Stevenson, Trust 
Division, American Bankers Association). 
 42. See Rodman Ward, Trust Service for Persons of Small Means, 62 Tr. Co. 610 (1936); see also 
Edward L. Clifford, Commingled Trust Funds, 11 Harv. Bus. Rev. 253 (1933). 
 43. Clifford, supra note 42, at 257–60. See generally L.B. Gunn, A Caution on Common Trust 
Funds, 16 Tr. Bull. 7 (1937) (warning that “the accounting expense is almost prohibitive under the 
plans developed to date”). 
 44. Infra Part III.A. 
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savings for banks sponsoring common trust funds,45 predicting that they 
would reap “profits that will delight their executives, directors, and 
stockholders.”46 
Like common trust fund legislation in other states, the New York 
statute of 193747 was sought by bankers and their lobbyists.48 Its supporters 
expressed the usual hopes that it would help the less wealthy by 
promoting diversification and cutting administration costs,49 while the Wall 
Street Journal also saw it as “enhancing profits”50 for the sponsoring 
banks. The New York statute differed from other state statutes in its far 
greater length and detail,51 and in its provision for binding accountings 
without individual notice (to be challenged in Mullane). As we shall see, 
the opposition to the New York statute was also more detailed, or at 
least more accessible to this author’s research. 
B. Obstacles 
The trust companies faced at least five kinds of difficulties as they 
sought to establish common trust funds. They confronted a legacy of 
mistrust, threats of liability, novel issues arising from the common trust 
fund’s novel approach, tax burdens, and competing providers. The 
presence of these difficulties explains why the trust companies needed to 
obtain authorizing legislation, and in part why that legislation took the 
form that it did. To some extent, it also explains why the New York 
drafters provided for frequent binding accountings.  
First, the behavior of investment companies during the stock market 
boom of the late 1920s had given rise to well-deserved suspicion, which 
 
 45. John Horn, Economies Through the Common Trust Fund, 67 Tr. Co. 54 (1938); Albert W. 
Whittlesey, Commingled Fund Recommended as Solution of Several Major Trust Problems, 58 Tr. Co. 
321, 324 (1934).  
 46. Albert W. Whittlesey, Post-War Trust Dollar and Common Trust Funds, 79 Tr. & Est. 551, 
554 (1944). 
 47. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561. 
 48. Letter of Samuel Aronowitz, Legislative Counsel for the Trust Cos. Ass’n of N.Y. (May 12, 
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of Chairman, Nat’l City Bank (May 11, 1937) (on file 
with the Governor’s File); Letter of Raymond Ball, President, N.Y. State Bankers Ass’n (May 22, 
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). 
 49. Letter of William R. White, Superintendent of Banking, State of N.Y. Banking Dep’t (May 
20, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of C. Alexander Capron (May 25, 1937) (on file 
with the Governor’s File) (replying to claims that expenses would be increased). 
 50. Small Trust Business in State Takes Forward Stride with Passage of Bill Enabling Banks To 
Pool Funds of Estates; Seen Enhancing Profits, Wall St. J., May 8, 1937 (on file with the Governor’s 
File). 
 51. In the compilation of eight statutes found in the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
New York statute alone occupied ten pages and its implementing regulations occupied nine more. See 
S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–52. The other seven statutes occupied four pages in all, and none was 
accompanied by regulations. Id. 
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ultimately led to the Investment Company Act of 1940.52 Trust companies, 
garbed in the traditional mantle of fiduciaries, might have been a bit less 
suspect than other financial innovators. But after all a common trust 
fund, just like investment companies, placed the funds of many investors 
under control of managers who might be incompetent or self-interested. 
Indeed, some of the entities appealing directly to investors had been 
organized as trusts or were known as investment trusts,53 while some of 
the pioneering common trust funds had been organized as corporations.54 
Even though only trusts could invest in common trust funds, trust 
companies might be suspected of urging investors to set up trusts, 
perhaps revocable trusts, so they could join in.  
The possibility of unleashing a new financial scam may have been 
what frightened someone in Governor Lehman’s office.55 One 
correspondent discussing a related measure noted a belief that, when 
trust companies allocated mortgages among several trusts, “there had 
been serious abuses and that the trust company’s own mortgages were of 
much higher quality than those held in trust for various beneficiaries.”56 
To avoid the danger that they would be regardedand 
regulatedlike investment companies, the trust companies disclaimed 
any speculative intent, and submitted their common trust funds to the 
relatively friendly supervision of the Federal Reserve System,57 and, in 
New York, the Banking Board.58 The Federal Reserve in turn required 
that no interest in a common trust fund should be negotiable or assignable, 
and that a trust could participate only if it was created and used for bona 
fide fiduciary purposes.59 Later, it restricted advertisements of common 
fund earnings.60 A single trust’s investment in a fund was limited (though 
this was not to survive) to $25,000.61 Perhaps most important, the trust 
 
 52. Pub. L. No. 75-768 (1940), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2014). See Matthew P. 
Fink, The Rise of Mutual Funds: An Insider’s View 9–19 (2d ed. 2011); S.E.C., Investment Trusts 
and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., pt. 3 (1939) (describing abuses and 
deficiencies). 
 53. Markham, supra note 28, at 137–43; S.E.C., supra note 28, at 29–31. 
 54. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 7–16. 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 56. Letter of Paul R. Taylor, Dep’t Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep’t (Mar. 30, 1937) (on file with 
the Governor’s File). 
 57. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740 § 169 (a)(2) (1936), amended by I.R.C. § 584 (a)(2) 
(2003). 
 58. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 14 (1)(c)). 
 59. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 27 (quoting Regulation F, Part (a)). Regulation F is the distant 
ancestor of 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2014). For discussion of Regulation F, see C. Alexander Capron, supra 
note 37. For similar state provisions, see Robert W. Bogue, Common Trust Fund Legislation, 5 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 430, 434 (1938). New York also barred revocable trusts from participating in a 
common trust fund. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561, 1562, ch. 687, § 1(1). 
 60. Trust Division, American Bankers Ass’n, Common Trust Funds: A Handbook on Their 
Purposes, Establishment, and Operation 15 (2d ed. 1948).  
 61. Id. at 14; 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561. 
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company or national bank sponsoring the fund could not receive 
compensation for its management,62 presumably because it was already 
being paid for its services as trustee of the participating trusts. Such 
provisions secured a common trust fund exemption from the Investment 
Companies Act,63 but would not prevent future controversy over the 
scope of that exemption.64 
Second, the collapse of land values after 1929 had exposed trustees 
and trust companies involved in split mortgages and mortgage pools to 
suits by disgruntled beneficiaries. Relying on fiduciary principles, plaintiffs 
argued that their trustees were not authorized to make joint investments,65 
that such investments improperly commingled trust assets while their 
makers failed to keep records specifying who owned what,66 and that 
trustees had engaged in improper self-dealing by selling their own 
mortgages to trusts of which they were trustees.67  
Although beneficiary suits often failed,68 they posed a continuing 
threat to trust companies, which were contemplating common trust funds 
and were well aware that markets could go down as well as up. That the 
New York statute legalized common trust fund investments by existing 
trusts, set up before such funds were recognized,69 shows that trust 
companies were aware of their exposure. They therefore needed to protect 
themselves through legislation legitimating investment in common trust 
funds and stating what records and procedures would be requiredand 
still better, by providing for court approval of their investments that would 
bar future claims. And opponents criticized the common trust fund’s 
infringement of the principle that “[e]ach estate, however small, should 
be kept separate and distinct.”70 
 
 62. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (3)); S.E.C., supra 
note 36, at 30 (quoting Regulation F, Part (b)(8)). Regulation F, Part (b)(8) was the ancestor of the 
more permissive 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (b)(9) (2014). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c)(3) (2014). 
 64. See infra Part III.F. 
 65. In re Waxelbaum’s Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 186 (Sur. Ct. 1935). For discussion of this and other 
possible objections, see Comment, Participation Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investment by 
Corporate Fiduciaries, 45 Yale L.J. 857, 866–73, 877 (1936). 
 66. Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 186 A. 543 (Conn. 1936); C.A.W., 
Jr., supra note 35.  
 67. In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1943); In re Tuttle’s Estate, 294 N.Y.S. 230 (Sur. Ct. 
1937). For common trust fund legislation modifying the ban on self-dealing, see Bogue, supra note 59, 
at 434–36. 
 68. E.g., Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Soc’y, 200 N.E. 541 (Mass. 1936) 
(explaining mortgage participation investment was permissible under Massachusetts “prudent 
investor” rule); In re Guthrie’s Estate, 182 A. 248 (Pa. 1936) (inadequate records did not cause loss). 
 69. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561, ch. 687, § 1(1). 
 70. Substitute Report No. 455, N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, Comm. on State Legislation (Apr. 28, 
1937) (on file with the Governor’s File); Letter of Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on file with the 
Governor’s File). 
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Third, in addition to problems already litigated, common trust funds 
raised a host of new issues that might give rise to future beneficiary suits. 
If two trusts invested equal sums in a trust whose holdings had changed 
in price between the first and the second investment, how should their 
respective interests be valued? If a trust withdrew its investment, as of 
what date should the sum to be received be calculated in an age before 
computers made it easy to calculate the total value of the fund at any 
instant? Legislation dealing with such matters would protect sponsoring 
banks from future challenges.71 
Fourth, in 1936 both federal and New York courts raised a tax 
barrier to common trust funds.72 Passing on cases involving the few 
existing funds, they held that the fund itself was a taxable entity, so that 
taxes might be collected from it as well as from its participating trusts and 
from the beneficiaries. The banks promptly obtained corrective 
legislation from Congress and the New York legislature.73 But that 
legislation limited its benefits to common trust funds in compliance with 
applicable regulations—the federal statute referring to the Federal 
Reserve Board regulations, and the New York statute adding the New 
York Banking Board—suggesting at least some concern that funds might 
misbehave. During the same years, mutual funds went through a parallel 
history, likewise winding up with tax benefits but also subject to 
regulation.74 
Fifth, the banks might have faced self-interested opponents of 
common trust funds. Sponsors of competing investment vehicles might 
have wished to stymie new rivals—though in the 1930s investment 
companies and the like were too unpopular themselves to wield as much 
legislative influence as they might today. But what about lawyers? One 
lawyer opponent of the New York legislation complained that “the bill is 
special legislation in favor of the corporate as against the individual 
trustee.”75 Individual trustees were often lawyers. The common trust fund 
legislation did not authorize them to establish funds for the investment of 
their trusts, except in Pennsylvania.76 They would therefore lack the 
advantage of being able to invite prospective trustors to diversify the 
investments of a small trust. Although there is no conclusive evidence 
that lawyers led the opposition, it is suggestive that a number of bar 
 
 71. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1561; Note, supra note 36, at 1390–93. 
 72. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 80 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1936); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Graves, 3 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1936). 
 73. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740 § 169 (1936), amended by I.R.C. § 584(a)(2) (2014); 
1937 N.Y. Laws 1561. 
 74. Fink, supra note 52, at 26–29; Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual 
Fund Industry, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 1478–83 (1991). 
 75. Letter from Frank H. Twyeffort 3 (May 11, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). 
 76. Bogue, supra note 59, at 432. Even if lawful, a common trust fund sponsored by a lawyer 
would rarely be economically practical. 
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association committees opposed the New York statute,77 and that the 
statute was crammed with detailed provisions likely to mollify or distract 
the legal mind. The provision for regular accountings may have been one 
of these: how could a lawyer object to a fund regularly blessed by a 
court? 
C. Accountings and Notice 
So far as I can tell, New York’s provisions for the settlement of 
common trust fund accounts by the court, including the notice provisions 
challenged in Mullane, were included entirely for the protection of the 
banks. None of those responsible for promoting common trust fund 
legislation said anything that I can find about protecting beneficiaries by 
giving them an opportunity to challenge the acts of a fund’s trustees. The 
statutory provisions were not shaped so as to promote such challenges—
if anything, the opposite. They thus resemble the features of today’s class 
action and aggregate settlements designed to ensure that those with 
possible claims will be precluded from asserting them elsewhere.78 Yet it 
does not follow that the New York statute actually did what its makers 
intended. On the contrary, we shall see that they may have overreached 
themselves, opening themselves up to court challenges rarer in other 
states.79 
The goal of common trust fund accountings, as stated by a New 
York trust company Vice President, was to “give the trustee full 
protection as to all investment matters reflected in the accounts.”80 It was 
the trustee who was to be protected, not the beneficiaries. A New York 
lawyer who assisted a committee of the American Bankers Association 
in its study of common trust funds found it “a practical necessity that 
some means should be provided for the periodic and final settlement of 
the accounts of a bank relating to a common trust fund, and that such 
settlement should be conclusive upon all parties interested in the 
participating trusts.”81 His concern, and that of others,82 was to avoid 
leaving trust companies open to challenge each time a trust participating 
in a common trust fund settled its own accounts. And the Trust Division 
of the American Bankers’ Association worried about “the possibility of 
annoyance from litigious beneficiaries who with a very small interest in 
 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 78. See Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 108–13, 136–43, 151–59 
(2007). 
 79. See infra Part II.C. 
 80. Baldwin Maull, Answering Objections to Common Trust Fund, 19 Tr. & Est. 55, 57 (1944). 
 81. Capron, supra note 37, at 450. 
 82. Bogue, supra note 59, at 437–38; Rodman Ward, Practical Problems in Operation, 66 Tr. Co. 
217, 221 (1938). 
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the fund might force expensive legal accountings covering the operation 
of the whole fund for many years.”83 
The New York statute implemented this plan by providing for what 
class action lawyers now call “global peace,”84 to be obtained through the 
magic of res judicata. It made the court’s decree “binding and conclusive 
in respect of any matter set forth in the account . . . upon all parties 
having or who may thereafter have any interest in such common trust 
fund or in any estate trust or fund held by such trust company.”85 One 
result was that beneficiaries of trusts whose funds were invested in a 
common trust fund would lose the right to challenge investment 
decisions, other than the decision to invest in the fund, and perhaps even 
that decision.86 Another was that persons who became beneficiaries after 
the accounting would be bound by it, which is an early example of the 
attempt to bind “futures” that has given rise to more recent 
controversy.87 Not satisfied with this level of immunity, the statute also 
barred challenges to good faith valuation decisions made pursuant to 
New York Banking Board rules.88 As a bar association committee 
pointed out, this exculpation was “somewhat anomalous” considering 
that a statute passed just the year before had barred will clauses granting 
executors and testamentary trustees a similar immunity.89  
The statutory notice provisions likewise appear to have been 
drafted to protect sponsoring trust companies by making challenges to 
their acts unlikely. The requirement for notice by publication, properly 
described by the Mullane court as a “feint,”90 forbade the identification of 
beneficiaries in the published announcement of each accounting, which 
was to include only the names of the grantor or decedent establishing the 
participating trusts.91 Directing (with much detail) the Trust company to 
send out copies of the statutory accounting provisions when trust assets 
were first invested in the common trust fund, and making later 
accountings binding only when that had been done,92 was properly 
characterized by a lower court judge in the Mullane case as manifesting a 
“studied purpose . . . to avoid giving such notice as is practicable” by 
 
 83. Trust Division, American Bankers Ass’n, Common Trust Funds: A Handbook on Their 
Purposes, Establishment, and Operation 47 (1939).  
 84. E.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 159 (2010). 
 85. 1937 N.Y. Laws 687 (codified as amended N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(6)). 
 86. In re Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 56–57 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952) 
(noting that courts have discretion to adjudicate propriety of investment by trust in common trust 
fund, with a binding effect). 
 87. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901 (2000); Rhonda 
Wasserman, Future Claimants and the Quest for Global Peace, 64 Emory L.J. 531 (2014). 
 88. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1565. This provision is no longer included in N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c. 
 89. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 24, at 857. 
 90. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 91. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567–68. 
 92. Id. at 1565–66. 
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creating “the appearance without the substance of real notice.”93 Indeed, 
even these clauses appear to have been meant to protect the banks by 
preventing objections to the investing of trust assets in a common trust 
fund.94  
These problems with the provisions for notice, which later gave rise 
to Mullane, were not entirely unobserved when the statute was passed. A 
prescient opponent of the statute pointed out while it was awaiting 
signature that  
[T]he beneficiaries of the small trusts scrambled into the huge common 
trusts are not to be properly advised of what is going on. . . . The 
picture of a beneficiary in New York City devoting himself from 
January 1 until April 1 in each year to the . . . perusal of all legal 
notices until, perchance, he finds . . . the name of the estate in which he 
is interested, is a picture which must have caused sardonic amusement 
to those who conceived this method of giving “notice.”95  
The final twist may have been provided by the requirement in the 
original statute of 1937 for annual accountings,96 amended by the time of 
Mullane to mandate accountings every three years.97 Although frequent 
accountings might have been meant to provide more careful judicial 
supervision for common trust funds, they might also have been intended 
to provide more frequent immunity baths for those sponsoring the funds. 
By the time an investment turned out to have been improvident, 
beneficiaries would no longer be able to challenge it. And as some critics 
of the legislation pointed out, the cost of annual accountings would have 
been substantial.98 
Those who sought to protect common trust fund sponsors from 
litigation had another course open to them, one followed by many states 
outside of New York that passed a common trust fund statute. In 1939, 
there were seven such states, and none of their statutes mentioned an 
accounting; at least one of these, Connecticut, had considered an 
accounting provision but then rejected it.99 As reported in 1951, soon 
after Mullane, about half of the thirty-one states with statutes had no 
provision for court accountings binding on beneficiaries, while many 
others allowed but did not require accountings (as provided in the 
 
 93. See In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129, 132 (App. Div. 1948) (Van 
Voorhis, J., dissenting); see also In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 280 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 
1947) (noting that a “colorable and illusory provision that seems to provide for notice and yet is 
calculated not to give notice”). 
 94. See In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d at 277–78. 
 95. Letter of Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on file with the Governor’s File). 
 96. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1566–67. 
 97. 1943 N.Y. Laws 1222. 
 98. Substitute Report No. 455, supra note 23; Letter from Frank H. Twyeffort (May 11, 1937) (on 
file with the Governor’s File).  
 99. S.E.C., supra note 36, at 31–32, 50–52; Ernest L. Averill, Common Trust Funds, 13 Conn. B.J. 
14, 24–25 (1939). 
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Uniform Common Trust Fund Act of 1938), and four subjected common 
fund accounts to the same requirements as those of ordinary trusts.100  
When the law does not require them, sponsors of common trust 
funds have been in no hurry to seek court accountings. So far as I can tell 
from reported cases, Massachusetts is the only state outside New York 
where they have occurred.101 As one California banker said, “we certainly 
do not plan to seek court settlement of our fund’s accountings . . . . [A]ny 
bank that prudently administers a common trust fund does not, in my 
opinion, need any judicial skirts behind which to hide.”102 Whether or not 
only sissies need accountings, it does seem that there is more than one 
way for a bank to protect itself from litigation, and that the bank going to 
court itself may not be the best way. 
III.  The MULLANE Litigation 
In focusing on the adequacy of notice to trust beneficiaries, Mullane 
may have missed the point. Neither before nor after the Supreme Court 
decision did beneficiaries play any detectable role whatsoever in 
common trust fund accountings. In reality, it is the guardians ad litem 
appointed under the New York statute103 to represent beneficiaries who 
provide the only representation for their interests. Yet the subsequent 
history of class actions teaches that this kind of representation may be 
impaired by conflicts between class members, or between the interests of 
the class and those of its representatives. So it is important to consider 
whether similar impairments have occurred in common trust fund 
accountings, and in particular, in Mullane itself.  
A. The Challenging Lawyer: Kenneth Mullane 
The due process claim adjudicated in Mullane was not raised for ten 
years after the New York statute came into effect, but not because it was 
too recondite to be noticed—as we have seen, lawyers at the time saw the 
problem104—and not because guardians ad litem were delinquent. Rather, 
there were no guardians because there were no accountings, and there 
were no accountings because there were no New York common trust 
funds. At the very moment the New York statute became available, it 
became known that only one large bank was preparing to establish a 
 
 100. Note, Accounting for Common Trust Funds: A Statutory Scheme, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 475 
(1951).  
 101. Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 464 N.E.2d 1341 (Mass. 1984); First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Aloisi, 481 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). 
 102. Claude C. Blakemore, Common Trust Fund Experience in California, 87 Tr. & Est. 35, 36 
(1948). 
 103. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567 (codified as amended at N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(6)). 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 91–96. 
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fund.105 And in fact, the first New York fund appeared only in 1944.106 Not 
until after World War II did the common trust fund movement take off 
nationally, and as late as 1948 New York had only four of the 
approximately sixty-five extant funds.107 
Some causes of slow development were national, but others can be 
traced to the special features of the New York statute. During the war, 
interest on U.S. bonds was high enough to make diversification into 
other investments relatively unimportant.108 An individual trust could 
only invest $25,000 in a common fund until 1945, when the Federal 
Reserve Board raised the maximum to $50,000, to the joy of bankers 
whose devotion to the little guy had its limits.109 Meanwhile, in New 
York, bankers complained of the “[e]xpensive and complicated accounting 
requirements under the State law.”110 The legislature responded by 
changing annual to triennial accountings; it also authorized “discretionary 
common trust funds” whose investments were not limited to the 
traditional trust menu.111  
As common trust funds appeared in New York, guardians ad litem 
began challenging some of their practices.112 Guardians also raised 
questions about the jurisdiction of the Surrogate’s Court, and about its 
power to use an accounting to pass on the propriety of a trust’s investment 
in a common trust fund.113 And on April 30, 1947, the Surrogate’s Court in 
Rochester upheld a guardian’s due process challenge to the statutory 
notice provisions.114 Less than a month later, Kenneth Mullane, guardian 
ad litem for the income beneficiaries of Central Hanover Bank and Trust 
Company’s Discretionary Trust Fund No. 1, raised the same due process 
 
 105. See State Gives Rules for Common Trusts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1938, at 29; Banks Here Plan 
Careful Study of Common Trusts, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1938, at 1. 
 106. See Obstacles to Common Trust Funds, 78 Tr. & Est. 475 (1944) (reporting the results of a 
survey of obstacles to creating common trust funds). 
 107. Gilbert T. Stephenson, Participating InvestmentsThe Common Trust Fund Device, 12 Ohio 
St. L.J. 522, 531 n.46 (1951). 
 108. See In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946); Louis S. Headley, 
Uses and Limitations of Common Trust Funds, 77 Tr. & Est. 465, 467 (1943). 
 109. B. Magruder Wingfield, Reappraisal of Common Trust Fund, 25 Tr. Bulletin 10, 13 (Apr. 
1946). By 1951, New York funds could accept investments of $100,000. 1951 N.Y. Laws 835. 
 110. See supra note 106.  
 111. 1943 N.Y. Laws 1219, 1222.  
 112. See In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 465–66 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946) (recognizing 
amortization and investments by trusts in common fund in the form of U.S. bonds); see also In re 
Cont’l Bank & Trust Co., 67 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946); In re Lincoln Rochester 
Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 53 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952) (dealing with investments by trusts 
created before common fund statute as well as objections to plan of operations and bank’s 
compensation); In re Chase Nat’l Bank, 116 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1952) (focusing on 
expenses chargeable to fund). 
 113. In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 267 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1947); In re Lincoln 
Rochester Trust Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 45, 50–51 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1952). 
 114. In re Security Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 282 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty.), rev’d, 92 N.Y.S.2d 308 
(App. Div. 1949), rev’d on reh’g, 97 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1950). 
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objection in the accounting proceeding that would give rise to the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
Was Mullane merely going through the motions of representing the 
interests of beneficiaries? Given the recent Rochester ruling, he could 
well have felt obliged to assert the notice issue. Indeed, his pleading said 
that, in view of that ruling, “I deem it my duty to raise” the issue, a rather 
lukewarm phrasing of his claim.115 He did not assert any other objections 
to the conduct of the accounting or of the common trust fund other than 
a jurisdictional point that had also been asserted in Rochester. When he 
examined the records of the fund, he found them all in order.116 
Yet Mullane’s representation was more than perfunctory, as evidenced 
by his ultimate triumph in the Supreme Court. When the trial court rejected 
his claim, he pursued an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to New York’s 
Appellate Division and Court of Appeals,117 followed by another appeal 
from the trial court’s final decree.118 In the Supreme Court, he filed an 
elaborate, albeit disorganized, ninety-page brief, and a twenty-three-page 
reply brief.119 
Mullane faced substantial opposition in court. Central Hanover was 
represented by the firm now known as Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, 
already a large corporate firm.120 The New York State Bankers 
Association defended the statutory notice provisions in an amicus brief.121 
Even the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the principal 
beneficiaries of the common trust fund told the court that he considered 
Mullane’s objections not to be valid.122 
Although the reputation of the court that appointed Mullane 
guardian ad litem, the Surrogate’s Court for New York County, has not 
always been savory, there seems no reason to believe that he was a hack 
appointed as a piece of political patronage, with the expectation that he 
would not rock the boat. Mullane was a long time member of the New 
 
 115. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 34–35. The New York County Surrogate’s Court 
has been unable to find the original files of the proceeding. 
 116. Id. at 190–98. 
 117. See In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397, 399 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1947), 
aff’d, 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1949), appeal dismissed, 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949). 
 118. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 87 N.E.2d 73 
(N.Y. 1949). 
 119. See Brief for Appellant, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) 
(No. 378); Reply for Appellant, Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (No. 378). The Supreme Court briefs of both 
parties were much the same as those they had filed in the New York Court of Appeals. 
 120. Erwin O. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? 34–35 
(1964) (noting that as of December 1957, Kelley, Drye, Newhall & Maginnes was the nineteenth 
largest firm, with fifty lawyers). 
 121. Brief for New York State Bankers Association, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (No. 378). A similar brief was filed 
in the New York Court of Appeals. 
 122. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 35–36. In the New York Court of Appeals, the 
guardian ad litem submitted a brief likewise opposing Mullane’s arguments. 
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York Bar and a graduate of Harvard Law School.123 He had considerable 
experience in trusts and estates litigation.124 He was later to be politically 
active in the Conservative Party of New York State,125 while Surrogate 
William T. Collins, who appointed him, was a Democrat, albeit one 
opposed by the Tammany Hall Democratic leadership.126 At any rate, if 
Surrogate Collins thought that Mullane would make no waves, he was 
wrong. 
B. Conflicts in the Class? 
New York’s common trust fund statute foresaw that one kind of 
conflict might arise in accountings by providing for two guardians ad 
litem––one to represent the beneficiaries interested in trust income and 
the other to represent those interested in principal.127 In the Mullane 
case, two instances of possible conflict between these two groups of 
beneficiaries and their guardians arose. One has already been mentioned: 
James N. Vaughan, representing the beneficiaries interested in principal, 
opposed Mullane’s due process claim, missing out on the chance of 
winning eternal glory by giving his name to a leading Civil Procedure 
case. It is not clear why Vaughan thought the due process claim was bad 
for principal beneficiaries. Perhaps he believed that requiring more 
extensive notice would increase the costs of accountings to be paid out of 
principal128 without affecting the result of accounting proceedings. If so, 
he had a point.  
The second conflict between income beneficiaries and principal 
beneficiaries was posed by Central Hanover when it asked the court to 
instruct whether certain stock dividends should be treated as income or 
principal.129 As it happened, both guardians agreed that they were income, 
which had also been the position suggested by Central Hanover.130 In this 
instance, the court proceeding was not adversarial and operated 
primarily as an immunity bath for Central Hanover, though it is certainly 
possible that Vaughan would have claimed the stock dividends as 
principal had he found plausible grounds for doing so. Like Mullane, he 
was no political hack, but an experienced lawyer131 with some reform 
 
 123. Kenneth J. Mullane, A Noted Lawyer, 68, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1977, at 26. 
 124. In re Eitingon, 72 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1947); In re Sittenfield, 54 N.Y.S.2d 507 (App. Div. 1945); 
In re Kilsheimer, 42 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1943). 
 125. See supra note 123. 
 126. Leo Egan, Collins Selected by Dewey to Fill Surrogate Post, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1946, at 1.  
 127. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1567–68 (codified as amended at N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (6)). A 
beneficiary could fall into both groups, for example, if she would not receive income until a time well 
into the future when the amount of that income would depend on the size of the principal.  
 128. In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946). 
 129. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 23. 
 130. Id. at 23, 155–56, 161. For a contemporary instance of dispute between the two guardians, see 
In re Bank of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 449–50 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1946). 
 131. E.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944). 
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credentials.132 He was not only a former law secretary to a Surrogate, but 
also a teacher of philosophy and law and something of an intellectual.133 
Although conflicts between income and principal beneficiaries were 
the only ones the New York statute contemplated, other conflicts among 
beneficiaries were possible. As one banker pointed out in 1943: 
A common fund is administered for the average trust and cannot give 
consideration to the needs of the particular account; the beneficiary of 
one trust may have use for tax exemption, his other income considered, 
whereas for another it is unimportant. . . . The beneficiary of a trust 
which has bought in when markets were low and yields were high 
suffers a reduction in income when new accounts are admitted after 
the market has arisen, at least where amortization is attempted; to a 
degree profits are capitalized and the funds of his trust are invested at 
a lower yield. To convert inherited securities on which the beneficiary 
is receiving the entire coupon usually has the same result.134 
Note that these are described, not as conflicts in accounting 
proceedings, but as conflicts in the actual operation of common trust funds, 
caused by placing the funds of many different trusts in a single investment 
pool. Yet they carry over into accountings, where members of different 
groups might wish to challenge decisions that others would favor.  
Do such conflicts call for subclassing and separate representation in 
common trust fund accountings? Certainly not always. One can tell 
whether any of these potential conflicts has been actualized only by 
examining the particular decisions made by the fund’s trustees. I am in 
no position to say whether any such conflicts existed in the Mullane case. 
Even when there is a real conflict of interest concerning a decision of the 
trustees, that decision may not be subject to legal challenge because the 
trustees of the common fund have considerable discretion.135 Yet it is 
hard to deny that, sometimes, beneficiaries will have conflicting interests 
that go unrepresented by the guardians ad litem in the accounting 
proceeding. The only safeguards in those situations are feeble ones: a 
beneficiary may respond to the Mullane notice; the Superintendent of 
Banking may spot the problem;136 or the court may see and act on its 
own. 
A final sort of conflict might exist between the guardians ad litem 
and the beneficiaries. Like class counsel, the guardians might want to 
swell their fees at the expense of the fund and its beneficiaries. Indeed, 
Justice Jackson, foreshadowing many critics of class lawyers,137 observed 
 
 132. Drive to ‘Divorce’ Tammany Started, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1943, at 29. 
 133. James N. Vaughan, Lawyer for Shubert Interests, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1977, at 20. 
 134. Headley, supra note 108, at 468.  
 135. See, e.g., In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1974). 
 136. 1937 N.Y. Laws 1568. The Superintendent’s involvement in accountings has been omitted in 
the current statute, N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c. 
 137. E.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051 
(1996). 
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in his opinion that the interests of beneficiaries were “presumably subject 
to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one 
who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless 
or uncompensatory contest.”138 This observation was no doubt meant to 
strengthen the case for beneficiary “voice” by undermining claims of 
guardian “loyalty.”139 The third safeguard, “exit,” allowing beneficiaries 
to opt out of accountings, was not considered.140 
In Mullane itself, the Surrogate’s Court awarded each guardian ad 
litem $1500 and the lawyers for Central Hanover $2000, all payable out 
of the fund, which had assets approaching three million dollars.141 A 
comparison of these awards makes clear that Mullane was not being paid 
off for some kind of abandonment of beneficiary interests. Beyond that, 
the fees do not appear exorbitant compared to at least some 
contemporary fee awards.142 But the Surrogate noted that the award 
covered only services in his court,143 so Mullane probably received more 
after he triumphed in the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Surrogate’s 
Court files for the case have mysteriously disappeared from their box,144 
leaving one free to imagine the best or the worst. 
In sum, although no signs of class conflicts other than those between 
income and principal beneficiaries appear in the surviving Mullane record, 
such conflicts are always a possibility in common trust fund accountings. 
Even if present, they did not appear because no one had any reason to 
bring them forward. And because no one brought them forward, the courts 
had no occasion to consider them. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s opinion did allude in two ways 
to the possibility that conflicting interests might yield inadequate 
representation, a possibility it had considered ten years earlier in 
Hansberry v. Lee.145 First, it noted that Central Hanover, trustee of both 
the common trust fund and its participating trusts, could not be expected 
to protect the beneficiaries: “[I]t is their caretaker who in the accounting 
 
 138. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Richard A. 
Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal Educ. 587, 600–02 (1989) (raising 
the question of Mullane’s motives). 
 139. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 376 (2000).  
 140. The beneficiaries were in effect a defendant class, so they would have had an incentive to use 
any opt out rights granted to them. See Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt 
Out: Lessons for Canada from the United States, 14 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 197, 209 (2004). 
 141. See Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 144–47. 
 142. E.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 569–71 (7th Cir. 1951); In re 
Lustron Corp., 196 F.2d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1952); Eddy v. Kelby, 163 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1947); Warner 
v. Warner, 215 P.2d 20, 23 (Cal. 1950); In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 125 N.Y.S.2d 495, 495 
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1953).  
 143. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 147. 
 144. Message from Kimberley A. Sulik, Archivist and Records Manager, Surrogate’s Court to 
John Leubsdorf (July 29, 2013) (on file with author). 
 145. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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becomes their adversary.”146 The Court was clearly correct that Central 
Hanover’s goal of securing a court decree approving its accounts that 
would bar the beneficiaries from future challenges was directly opposed 
to the beneficiaries’ interest in raising such challenges if and when they 
learned of misconduct in the management of the fund. True, Central 
Hanover might have brought possible conflicts among the beneficiaries 
to the court’s attention in order to be sure of obtaining a judgment that 
could not be collaterally challenged147 for inadequate representation. 
Class action defendants sometimes do this, but usually when they have 
something else to gain such as denial of class certification.148 
Second, the Mullane Court relied on the absence of conflicts within 
the class when it ruled that notice to every class member was not 
required: 
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The 
individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a 
class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of 
the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore, notice 
reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is 
likely to safeguard the interests of all since any objection sustained 
would inure to the benefit of all.149 
This is not entirely correct. The interests of the beneficiaries are 
“identical” in some respects, but not in others. In any event, the Court 
relied on adequate representation by some class members as an 
alternative to individual procedural rights, just as it was later to do in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.150 Again, Mullane prefigures later class 
action jurisprudence. And it also points out a relationship between notice 
and representation requirements, often regarded as posing separate 
issues. Here, the claim is that adequate representation justifies weaker 
notice requirements. Somewhat unrealistically, the Court relied more on 
the willingness of beneficiaries to appear and object than on the presence 
in court of guardians appointed to represent beneficiary interests. It did 
this even though the economic stake of any beneficiary in the accounting 
was miniscule, since the trusts being pooled were all small ones.  
C. The Case Begins 
Had Mullane been a class action, the court would have had an 
obligation to protect the interests of class members even without being 
 
 146. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1949). 
 147. E.g., State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003). 
 148. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50–51 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). On the standing of defendants to raise such issues, see Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803–06, 809–10 (1985). 
 149. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. 
 150. 472 U.S. 797, 809–14 (1985). 
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asked.151 The Surrogate’s Court is likewise entitled to question accounts 
laid before it even in the absence of an objection.152 Whether because 
there was nothing worth questioning or because it relied on the 
guardians ad litem to find anything questionable, the Mullane court 
limited itself to passing on Mullane’s objections.  
Mullane raised those objections before Surrogate Collins by filing a 
special appearance challenging the Surrogate’s Court’s jurisdiction on 
two grounds.153 The first was that the notice provisions of the New York 
common trust fund statute were insufficient to provide due process, so 
that “the notice given herein is inadequate to confer jurisdiction herein 
upon this Court.”154 The second was that the Surrogate’s Court lacked 
jurisdiction under state law because Central Hanover “has commingled 
in the common trust fund moneys from inter vivos trusts with moneys 
from testamentary trusts,” and the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
former.155 Although the Monroe County Surrogate’s court in Rochester 
had recently upheld both objections,156 the second one was not promising, 
granted the language of the New York statute and its rejection by Judge 
Collins’ fellow-Surrogate James Delehanty.157 Making that objection did, 
however, allow Mullane to use the word “commingled”—commingling 
was a sin under trust law.158 
When Mullane’s objections came on for hearing, each party headed 
down a different factual track. Central Hanover introduced the 
testimony of three bankers from three different banks that to ascertain 
and locate every beneficiary of the trusts invested in the common fund 
would be difficult and burdensome.159 Surrogate Collins intervened once 
or twice to reinforce this point.160 Mullane, introducing no witnesses of 
his own, cross-examined those of Central Hanover to establish that it 
would indeed be practical to send notice, not to all beneficiaries, but to 
those who had received notice when the funds of their trusts were first 
invested in the common fund.161 These divergent tracks outlined the 
 
 151. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 
1987); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 679–80 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 152. Stortecky v. Mazone, 650 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1995); In re De Vany, 132 N.Y.S. 582 (App. Div. 
3d Dept. 1911), rev’d on other grounds, 98 N.E. 1101 (N.Y. 1912); In re Estate of Andrus, 381 N.Y.S.2d 
985 (Sur. Ct. Allegany Cnty. 1976). 
 153. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 34–35. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. In re Sec. Trust Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sur. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1947). As of 1950, two banks in 
Rochester had sponsored common trust funds, as compared to nine in New York, and two elsewhere 
in the state. Stephenson, supra note 107, at 532 n.46. 
 157. In re Hoaglund’s Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 156, 164 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947). 
 158. See supra notes 66–71, 87–88. See Restatement (Third) Trusts § 84, 214–16 (2007) for 
examples of commingling. 
 159. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 38–41, 44–48, 51–54. 
 160. Id. at 41, 58–59. 
 161. Id. at 41–43, 48–51, 55–57. 
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Supreme Court’s ultimate holding: common trust funds would not be 
required to send notice to all beneficiaries, but would be required to 
notify those whose names and addresses were in their records. 
The case had a long voyage on its way to the Supreme Court. 
Surrogate Collins filed an opinion rejecting Mullane’s objections to 
jurisdiction,162 leading to an interlocutory appeal that was rejected on the 
merits by the Appellate Division,163 and then dismissed for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Appeals.164 Mullane then had to 
return to the Surrogate’s Court for the entry of a final decree,165 duly 
affirmed by the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals.166 Only then 
could he bring his appeal before the Supreme Court.167 
The only opinion rendered in the Mullane case by the New York 
courts, other than that of Surrogate Collins, was the passionate dissent of 
Judge Van Voorhis from the Appellate Division’s unexplained decision 
upholding the notice provisions.168 Judge Van Voorhis, soon to be promoted 
to the New York Court of Appeals as “outstandingly qualified,”169 was 
never reluctant to dissent when constitutional liberties were at stake.170 
One aspect of this case that gripped him was the “studied purpose” of 
the statute to avoid giving practicable notice of accountings,171 masked by 
its provision for notice at an earlier time, when a trust’s assets were 
invested in the common fund. 
It is remarkable that so much care should have been taken by the 
statute to inform interested parties of the general structure of the law, 
and of the making of the initial investment in the common fund, which 
the beneficiaries would be powerless to alter or to prevent, but that the 
Act should limit so drastically as to render practically nugatory the 
much more important notice of the judicial settlement of the accounts 
of the trustees.172 
 
 162. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947). 
 163. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 
1948). 
 164. Matter of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 85 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y. 1949). 
 165. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 133. 
 166. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1st Dept.), aff’d, 
87 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1949). 
 167. Transcript of Record, supra note 17, at 234–39. At the time, the case was appealable as of 
right under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 because the New York courts had upheld the validity of a challenged 
New York statute. Robert L. Stern, et al., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (Dec. 
1988). 
 168. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1948). 
 169. Appeals Bench Is Filled: Governor Appoints Van Voorhis to State’s Highest Court, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 24, 1953, at 35; State Bar Grades Bench Candidates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1954, at 21.  
 170. E.g., People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 277 (N.Y. 1963); Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of 
N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402, 407 (N.Y. 1963); People v. Sibron, 219 N.E.2d 196, 197 (1966), rev’d, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 171. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 129; see also supra note 93. 
 172. In re Accounting of Cent. Hanover Bank, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
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He pointed out that notice and binding account provisions like that 
of New York were “not contained in the statutes of the other 28 states 
having legislation upon this subject,” and drew attention to the very 
limited powers of the superintendent of banks to supervise common trust 
fund investments.173 Then the case moved on to the Supreme Court, to 
which Mullane had an appeal as of right because the New York courts 
had rejected a constitutional challenge to a New York statute.174 
D. The Supreme Court Speaks 
The Court’s almost unanimous decision in Mullane took some 
achieving. When the Court first conferred, the vote was five to three in 
favor of reversal, the ultimate result. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Clark and Minton supported that result, but Chief Justice Vinson and 
Justices Burton and Reed would have affirmed the New York courts, and 
Justice Douglas did not participate.175 Ultimately Justices Vinson and 
Reed joined the majority, while Justice Burton filed a dissent, one 
routinely omitted in Civil Procedure casebooks. 
Justice Burton was not a frequent dissenter,176 and his brief and 
bland opinion yields only limited insight into why he felt strongly about 
this case: 
These common trusts are available only when the instruments creating 
the participating trusts permit participation in the common fund. 
Whether or not further notice to beneficiaries should supplement the 
notice and representation here provided is properly within the discretion 
of the State. The Federal Constitution does not require it here.177 
Justice Burton’s first point—that trustors have consented to the 
statutory notice provisions—foreshadows more recent law on contracting 
out of jurisdictional law,178 and also recalls one of his own opinions for 
the Court.179 Yet even today’s Court might well shrink from upholding 
 
 173. Id. at 131. 
 174. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1949). 
 175. Papers of Robert H. Jackson on Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (on file in the 
Library of Congress, Box 164, file for case No. 378). Note that this file is not paginated, and the order 
of composition of its components is often unclear. 
 176. David N. Atkinson, Justice Harold H. Burton and the Work of the Supreme Court, 27 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 69, 73–74, 84 (1978). 
 177. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.  
 178. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 314–15 (1964) (upholding contractual 
designation of local agent for service of process, at least when agent mails process to the defendant). 
See generally Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (presenting the same 
jurisdictionally contracting out issue but in the context of forum selection clauses); Armstrong v. 
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176 (Del. 1980) (becoming officer or director of Delaware corporation 
creates jurisdiction over claims arising out of one’s conduct as such). Reliance on explicit or implicit 
consent as a ground for jurisdiction dates back at least to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1878).  
 179. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (Burton, J.). South 
Dakota may not refuse to enforce as contrary to public policy a contractual limitations period of an 
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implicit consent, ascribed not only to trustors but also to beneficiaries, to 
be bound without notice of the proceeding other than publication. The 
reference to “notice and representation” suggests a theory that adequate 
representation by Mullane and the other appointed guardian might suffice 
to bind beneficiaries without notice, a theory supported by the Court’s 
1940 decision in Hansberry v. Lee.180 But again, it is dubious that even 
adequate representation could overcome the lack of notice (other than 
publication) to any of those to be bound.181 Perhaps the best explanation 
of Justice Burton’s dissent is that, even when some colleagues disagreed, 
he regularly voted to uphold state court jurisdiction.182 
It must have been the desire to head off arguments such as Justice 
Burton suggestedand in particular, to win over Chief Justice Vinson 
and Justice Reed to the majoritythat caused Justice Jackson to write an 
opinion that emphasized the rightful powers of the state and the minimal 
requirements of due process almost more than the actual holding that 
New York had not satisfied those requirements. When Justice Jackson’s 
clerk Howard C. Buschman, Jr. first outlined an opinion, he made a few 
simple points: the in rem versus in personam distinction was not helpful; 
the beneficiaries had some right to be heard, while the state had a 
legitimate interest in closing estates; New York had not provided any 
form of personal notice; and mailing notice to the known beneficiaries 
would accommodate both state and beneficiary interests.183 Although 
Buschman, similar in this respect to other clerks, later recalled that the 
Court issued his own draft “in Jackson’s name almost without editing,”184 
Justice Jackson’s papers contain many pages of rewriting, continuing 
through two printed versions of the opinion.185 One result was to add a 
number of phrases in Justice Jackson’s colorful style. Another was to 
make clear that the Court was not limiting New York’s power to deal 
with a practical problem in a practical way, reassuring the possible 
 
Ohio fraternal benefit society lawfully under Ohio law when a society member sues for insurance 
benefits in South Dakota. Id. 
 180. 311 U.S. 32, 40–43 (1940). 
 181. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558–59 (2011). 
 182. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256, 260–61 (1958) (joining Justice Black’s dissent, which 
relied on the jurisdictional holding in Mullane); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 
438 (1952) (Burton, J.); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643 
(1950) (pending together with Mullane as Justice Jackson was one of the dissenters who rejected state 
jurisdiction); see Mary Frances Berry, Stability, Security, and Continuity 137 (Greenwood Press 
1979) (ascribing Burton’s Mullane dissent to his states' rights views).  
 183. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175. The Papers, dated March 21, 1950, provide for 
the Outline of the Present Opinion and are signed “HCB.” Id. For the identification of HCB as 
Buschman, see John Q. Barrett, Howard C. Buschman, Jr. (1917-2009) Jackson Law Clerk, The 
Jackson List (2009), http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20090313-Jackson-List-
Buschman.pdf (last visited Aug.5, 2015). 
 184. Id. at 4. This report of Buschman’s recollection is apparently based on an interview in “his 
later years,” many decades after Mullane had been decided. Id. at 5. 
 185. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175. 
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dissenters. It may have been the need to minimize dissent by qualifying the 
Court’s analysis that caused Justice Black (far from Justice Jackson’s 
closest friend on the Court186) to congratulate him on how he “handled 
this delicate question.”187 
Justice Jackson’s opinion thus traced a sinuous course, carefully 
awarding points to each side. At the outset, he upheld New York’s 
jurisdiction to enter a binding decree to settle trust accounts.188 Next, he 
expounded the need for notice when beneficiaries’ interests were at 
stake, rejecting notice by publication as no “more than a feint.”189 That 
phrasing might recall Judge Van Voorhis’ portrayal of the notice 
provisions as designed to give the appearance without the reality of 
notice, as well as Justice Jackson’s own quips about farmers forced to 
read the Federal Register to discover their rights.190 At any rate, he then 
swerved to support Central Hanover’s position by finding it unnecessary 
to send notice to beneficiaries whose whereabouts were not already 
known,191 only to turn once again to strike down as unconstitutional the 
denial of notice to those whose whereabouts were known192—but with a 
final proviso that notice could be accomplished by ordinary mail.193 
The opinion’s appearance of evenhandedness was reached only by 
painting Mullane’s position as more radical than it was—indeed, by 
outright misrepresentation of his claims. He had not challenged “the 
power of the State—the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against 
those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York.”194 On the 
contrary, he agreed that, provided adequate notice was given, New 
York’s jurisdiction over nonresidents “is sufficient for New York to 
authorize its courts to render a judgment in personam against such 
persons to the extent necessary for the proper administration of the said 
fund. . . .”195 Actually, an early version of the Jackson opinion had stated 
that “Appellant does not and indeed he could not seriously challenge the 
jurisdiction or power of the state to proceed in the matter involved 
here,”196 a correct statement wholly at odds with what appeared in the 
published opinion.  
 
 186. Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203 (1988). 
 187. See Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175 for a handwritten note from Justice Black, 
Apr. 20, 1950. 
 188. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 189. Id. at 315. 
 190. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947). 
 191. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317–18. 
 192. Id. at 318–20. 
 193. Id. at 319. 
 194. Id. at 311. 
 195. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 15. The point was repeated in Appellant’s Reply Brief, 
supra note 119, at 6 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 196. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, for a handwritten insert in a printed draft dated 
March 1950. 
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Likewise, Mullane did not argue that the proceeding was in 
personam and that therefore “the Surrogate is without jurisdiction as to 
nonresidents upon whom personal service of process was not made.”197 On 
the contrary, his argument that the proceeding was in personammore 
precisely, that it was at least in part in personam198was advanced simply 
to rebut Central Hanover’s central argument199 that the case fell within 
the rule that notice by publication sufficed in proceedings in rem.200 
Mullane itself was to help destroy that rule.201 Mullane expressly 
disclaimed any contention that personal service was required, relying on 
the possibility of notice by mail.202 Nor, despite Justice Jackson’s 
intimation,203 did Mullane claim that Central Hanover must send 
individual notice to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses were 
unknown to it.204 The opinion thus appeared to be slapping down 
contentions that Mullane had never advanced, presumably in order to 
show how balanced it was. 
In reality, Mullane’s position coincided with the Court’s conclusions, 
albeit expressed less gracefully and with more technical entanglement. 
One reading of this coincidence was that Mullane was one of those rare 
advocates who can find precisely the argument that appeals to the court. 
Another is that, having no visible clients to satisfy, he was free and 
indeed obliged to seek the result he considered best for all concerned, 
even at the expense of some beneficiaries. Here again, he could act like a 
class action lawyer.205 A third reading is that, for whatever reason, Mullane 
carefully avoided any contention that might seriously upset common trust 
funds or the banks sponsoring them. He did not, for example, argue that 
beneficiaries who received no notice should not be bound, even though 
common trust funds outside New York were getting along without 
 
 197. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–12. 
 198. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 58–61. 
 199. Brief for Appellee Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., at 14–34, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949) (No. 378). This was also the central argument of the Brief of 
New York State Bankers Ass’n, supra note 121, at 7–11. 
 200. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1914); Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1909); 
see Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1948) (distinguishing divorce from in personam money 
judgment). 
 201. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 
(1956). 
 202. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 13, 41, 76–77; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 119, 
at 5. 
 203. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1949) (“[W]e overrule 
appellant’s constitutional objections to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any 
beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee.”). 
 204. Brief for Appellant, supra note 119, at 16, 41, 76–77. That had also been his position in the 
trial court. In re Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 397, 408 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1947). 
 205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4) (providing that class counsel must represent interests of the class); 
see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco, 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that class counsel may advocate 
settlement opposed by some named plaintiffs). 
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binding accountings. The result was that both sides won: the Court 
portrayed common trusts approvingly and upheld binding accountings, 
while giving Mullane himself a victory and many beneficiaries a right to 
notice. 
Though Justice Jackson’s destination coincided with Mullane’s 
position, his starting point was the New York State Bankers Association 
amicus brief’s portrait of the common trust fund as a beneficent 
innovation protecting people of small and moderate means.206 As not 
only a New Dealer but also a former bank lawyer and director in 
Jamestown, New York, Justice Jackson could sympathize with this 
position. Justice Minton may have detected the influence of Justice 
Jackson’s background when he approved the opinion in a letter stating “I 
am for Jamestown jurisprudence!”207 In any event, the implication of 
Justice Jackson’s description of common trust funds was that 
constitutional law should not be allowed to strangle such a fine thing. 
Justice Jackson’s description emphasized the economies of the common 
trust fund more than its facilitation of investment diversification.208 That 
enabled him to argue that expensive searches for contingent beneficiaries 
“would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its 
advantages.”209 His opinion thus looked forward to the inclusion of cost 
in the due process calculus.210 
Having established an implicit foundation for his argument in public 
policy, Justice Jackson proceeded to fuzz over the distinction between in 
rem and in personam actions as a basis for jurisdictional rules.211 
Rejection of broad conceptual classifications as a premise for judicial 
decision was of course a classic legal realist ploy,212 also used by Justice 
Jackson’s friend213 Justice Frankfurter,214 who enthusiastically praised 
Justice Jackson’s opinion.215 Here, it enabled the Court to sidestep the 
 
 206. Brief of New York State Bankers Association, supra note 121, at 2–4. 
 207. Eugene C. Gerhart, America’s Advocate: Robert H. Jackson 41, 56–57 (1958); Papers of 
Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, at letter of Justice Sherman Minton, Apr. 21, 1950. 
 208. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307–08. 
 209. Id. at 318. 
 210. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
 211. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–13. 
 212. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 
(1935); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 416 
(1921). 
 213. Gerhart, supra note 207, at 165–66, 230, 305; H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 
185–88 (1981). 
 214. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 
(1943). 
 215. Papers of Robert H. Jackson, supra note 175, handwritten note (noting “[y]our Notice case 
suits me down to the ground and will be an invaluable stream of sanity and clarity”) (emphasis in 
original). Justice Frankfurter made one suggestion that Jackson adopted, the inclusion of citations to 
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) and Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 315. 
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parties’ debate about how the accounting should be classified216 without 
having to reconsider precedents that relied on the classification. 
Appearing to rise above technicality, the Court could go on to appraise 
the effectiveness of notice by publication and by ordinary mail in a 
practical way.217 In the process, it opened the way to the rejection of 
special jurisdictional rules for “in rem” proceedings based on the 
presence of property within the forum state.218 
With the traditional classification out of the way, Justice Jackson 
could allow the New York courts to cut off the rights of beneficiaries 
elsewhere by holding that: 
[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist 
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of 
its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond 
doubt the rights of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, 
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full 
opportunity to appear and be heard.219 
Reliance on the forum state’s interests and regulatory authority was at 
that time a prominent theme of the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
decisions,220 and was perhaps implied by the reference in Justice Burton’s 
dissent to “the discretion of the State.”221 Still to come was the doctrine 
that “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the 
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state.”222  
Under today’s doctrine, personal jurisdiction to bind out of state 
beneficiaries could be questioned because, although receiving benefits 
from the New York common trust fund, they did so because of someone 
else’s act in making them beneficiaries, without themselves “purposefully” 
reaching out to New York.223 To uphold jurisdiction, the Court would have 
had to rely on the theory of jurisdiction by necessity224 or on the sort of 
 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 193–202. 
 217. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15, 319. 
 218. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206–07 (1977); see also Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 
(1972); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
245–51 (1958) (relying on the in rem versus in personam distinction). 
 219. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
 220. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 
U.S. 643, 647–48 (1950); see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1955) (relying similarly on 
forum state’s interests in Full Faith and Credit Clause case). 
 221. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
 222. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. 
 223. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122–23 (2014). 
 224. George P. Fraser, Jr., Jurisdiction by Necessity: An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 305 (1951); Chilenye Nwapi, A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction, 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 211 
(2014); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984) (reversing 
judgment on that theory). 
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analysis it later invoked in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts225 to hold that 
out of state class members could be bound by an Oklahoma judgment 
because they benefited from being able to sue as a class, enjoyed 
adequate representation without having to appear, and received notice 
and the right to opt out. In short, the Court would have had to treat the 
trust accounting as a class action brought by the bank against a defendant 
class of beneficiaries. But Mullane differs from Phillips Petroleum. The 
Mullane beneficiaries reaped little benefit from the common trust fund 
accounting, and only some of them would receive notice (unaccompanied 
by the right to opt out) under the Court’s ruling. Thus under today’s 
standards, Justice Jackson’s jurisdictional conclusions might not stand up 
as a matter of first impression. 
Once the Court had established that New York could establish 
common trust funds and determine in an accounting proceeding the 
interests of both resident and nonresident beneficiaries, it followed that 
the state could not be required to make personal service on known 
beneficiaries, or to give individualized notice to beneficiaries whose 
identity or addresses were unknown to Central Hanover. Either 
requirement would have frustrated “the vital interest of the State in 
bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement.”226 Moreover, 
the Court had already turned service of process from a means of asserting 
jurisdiction227 to an obligation of fair notice.228 Likewise, notice by 
publication had been upheld for defendants whose whereabouts were 
unknown.229 The only remaining issue was whether notice by publication 
would suffice for known beneficiaries who could be reached by ordinary 
mail. Once the issue was posed in those terms, there could be only one 
answer. 
One mystery remains: why did Justice Jackson fail to cite 
International Shoe?230 How could an opinion written only five years after 
the leading case on personal jurisdiction and notice fail even to mention 
it? The most plausible explanation is that, less than two months after 
Mullane was decided, Justice Jackson joined Justices Minton, Reed and 
Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion stating that International Shoe 
allowed jurisdiction only over corporations with agents acting within the 
 
 225. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Kevin M. Clermont, Principles of Civil Procedure 334 n.303 (4th ed. 
2015) (analyzing Mullane as a defendant class action). 
 226. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
 227. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91–92 (1917). 
 228. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 
(1945); Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928). 
 229. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); Blinn v. 
Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); see also Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912)); Sec. Sav. Bank v. California, 
263 U.S. 282, 288–89 (1923). 
 230. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320. 
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forum state.231 On that reading, International Shoe would not have 
supported jurisdiction in the Mullane case. And relying on it for any 
proposition at all might have stirred up controversy within the Court. It 
is also possible that, at that time, International Shoe was regarded as just 
one important but not seminal case on personal jurisdiction, as important 
as much for what it said about a state’s regulatory and taxing authority232 
as for its bearing on procedural due process. Neither the Court nor the 
parties treated it as sweeping away previous doctrine. 
E. Aftermath 
The requirements imposed by Mullane did not stunt the growth of 
common trust funds. In 1950, the year of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
there were twenty-three funds in New York.233 By 1952, there were 
twenty-nine, and their value had increased during the past year from 
$171.5 million to $243.3 million.234 Nationwide, in 1950 there were 101 
funds with assets of about $425 million,235 while by the end of 1959 there 
were 366 funds with assets of more than $2.7 billion.236 Two years later, 
there were 511 funds with assets of $3.5 billion.237 As self-employed people 
became able to set up individual retirement funds,238 trust companies 
dreamed of channeling billions more into their common trust funds.239 
But growth invited attention. In 1962, federal regulation of common 
trust funds was shifted from the Federal Reserve Board to the 
Comptroller of Currency. As common trust funds began to appeal for 
business beyond beneficiaries of trusts run by their sponsoring banks, the 
Securities Exchange Commission decided that they should register as 
sellers of securities and disclose information to the general public.240 
After all, they were now competing with mutual funds, which had to do 
 
 231. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 658–59 (1950). 
 232. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 575 (1949); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 
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just that. The bankers and the Comptroller disagreed,241 with the 
Comptroller even taking to the law reviews to expound his position.242 An 
interagency brouhaha ensued, complete with Congressional hearings and 
proposed legislation.243 Ultimately, the SEC softened its position, but by 
no means abandoned it.244 It still acts against common trust funds that 
transgress the narrow boundaries established in the 1930s.245 
Later in the 1960s, a further skirmish broke out. This time the 
mutual funds sought to keep the banks from developing common trust 
funds into collective investment funds and the Comptroller from allowing 
the banks to do so. The Supreme Court struck down the Comptroller’s 
permissive regulation as a violation of the Glass Steagall Act, which 
barred banks from trading in securities on their own account.246 But 
gradually banks were able to enter the mutual fund business,247 and in 
1999 Glass Steagall was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.248 
Whether or not mutual funds are run by banks, John Langbein 
reports that they “have been supplanting common trust funds as the 
pooling vehicle of choice for trust investing. Mutual funds have 
significant advantages over common trust funds, and in 1996 Congress 
facilitated the spread of mutual funds for trust investing by allowing tax-
free conversion of existing common trust funds to mutual funds.”249 
Mutual funds were reported to yield better returns than common trust 
funds250 and even some common fund sponsors invested fund assets in 
mutual funds251 or turned common funds into mutual funds.252 
Interestingly, one of the mutual fund advantages asserted by Langbein is 
that “[i]n some states, especially New York, common trust funds are 
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required to undergo periodic judicial accountings, a form of make-work 
that provides ample opportunity for the court to appoint politically well-
connected guardians ad litem to litigate imaginary grievances at the 
expense of the fund and its underlying trust beneficiaries.”253 He goes on 
to mention Mullane, but without saying whether he considers that the 
denial of notice it remedied was one of the “imaginary grievances.” 
Views such as Langbein’s help explain why the interval between 
accountings was extended from three to four years in 1958,254 from four 
to six in 1975,255 and from six to ten in 1986.256 
Nevertheless, common trusts of one sort or another continue to 
exist, and have even expanded their market share in recent years, now 
holding at least $1.6 trillion in total assets.257 Nowadays they are 
sometimes called Collective Investment Trust Funds. That term includes 
common trust funds of the traditional kind, but also funds (apparently 
holding more assets) consisting solely of retirement accounts and the 
like.258 Some common trust funds are even marketed online to wealthy 
investors.259 So the common trust fund has indeed turned out to be what 
some feared in the 1930s, a competitor for investment companies.260 
Conclusion: Comparisons 
Mullane foreshadows our current class action controversies in one 
final way: considering it in its historical context raises questions about 
alternative procedures. In the case of class actions, restrictive Supreme 
Court decisions have turned some of the flow of mass tort litigation into 
new channels, notably prepackaged bankruptcy and aggregate 
settlements,261 while Troy McKenzie has recently drawn our attention to 
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the historical precedent of the equity receivership.262 As Judith Resnik 
has shown, Mullane likewise constitutes an important forbear of current 
aggregation methods.263 Many of the dynamics of such methods 
recapitulate those of class actions, but the procedural safeguards are 
different and not necessarily superior. Likewise, other ways of pooling 
investments have much in common with the New York common trust 
fund, but protect investors in different ways. 
The growth of mutual funds thus casts an interesting light on the 
approach taken in Mullane. Mutual funds do not submit their dealings to 
a court in a quest for globally binding absolution, with or without notice 
or representation. The main safeguards for their honest and competent 
conduct consist of disclosure requirements, and the ease with which 
investors can sell their interests. These safeguards are of course related: 
disclosure is supposed to ensure that investors and potential investors 
will know when to buy or sell. Despite the safeguards, the mutual fund 
industry has known price collapses and scandals.264 These in turn have led 
to class actions by investors,265 bringing us back to the realm of notice and 
representation. On the other hand, in a few recent instances legal claims 
have themselves been incorporated, albeit without much protection for 
the resulting stockholders.266 
Another point of comparison is provided by the states that do not 
require common trust funds to undergo judicial accountings, with or 
without notice. Outside New York and Massachusetts,267 there seems to 
be no reported instance of a bank instituting a judicial accounting 
proceeding in a state allowing it to do so. Other safeguards have, 
however, emerged. In some instances, federal regulatory authorities step 
in to stop common trust fund abuses.268 In others, common trust fund 
beneficiaries have found a remedy in court. Not surprisingly, it is in the 
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form of a class action.269 Whether class members will be bound by the 
disposition of such an action has raised the usual issues of notice and 
representation.270 
Meanwhile, New York guardians ad litem, including Kenneth 
Mullane,271 continued to raise challenges to the accounts of common trust 
funds272 and to be paid for doing so.273 I have not found any instance in 
which a trust beneficiary sought to raise her own challenges, or indeed to 
participate in any way. Nor have I found even one reported case since 
Mullane in which the guardian’s challenge prevailed, though in one 
instance the banks had to procure the enactment of a retroactive 
authorizing statute in order to defeat the challenge.274 So the benefit of 
the accounting proceeding, with or without notice, seems to be limited to 
keeping trustees on their toes—and of course protecting banks from later 
challenges.275 
I conclude that, although the general principles of notice that the 
Supreme Court laid down in Mullane are sound, they did little good in 
the context of common trust fund accountings. John Langbein may be 
correct that accountings are a waste of money,276 in which case the rise of 
mutual funds may have provided better protection for investors than 
anything the Due Process Clause could warrant. But even if he is wrong, 
it is entirely clear that any benefit accountings produce comes from the 
participation of the guardians ad litem, and that notice to the 
beneficiaries has no effect other than to make it easier to claim that they 
are bound by the results. It might be preferable to dispense with both the 
notice and the binding effect, or at least to legislate broad exceptions to 
 
 269. Meyer v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 106 F.R.D. 356, 364 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (certifying class); 
First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 425 So.2d 415, 423–24 (Ala. 1982) (upholding claim of imprudent 
investments); Parsky v. First Union Corp., No. 771, 2001 WL 535786, at *9 (Ct. Com. Pl. Pa. 2001) 
(certifying class). 
 270. Brooks v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 06-00955, 2007 WL 2702949, *5–6 (E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d, 
312 Fed. Appx. 494 (3d Cir. 2009) (showing a class member bound by a settlement could not 
collaterally attack sufficiency of notice); Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 255–56 
(Tex. 2002) (explaining that once the court properly rejected putative class representative’s claim, 
there could be no class action, and other members would not be bound). 
 271. In re Marine Midland Bank, 354 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1974). 
 272. See In re Bankers Trust Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1995); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 
813 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005); In re Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 396 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sur. 
Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977). 
 273. In re Bankers Trust Co., 1996 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 614 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1996) (approving 
further interim fee awards of $40,000 plus disbursements to one guardian and $15,000 to the other). 
 274. In re OnBank & Trust Co., 688 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1997). 
 275. Estate of Mendleson, 706 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2000); In re Marine Midland 
Bank, 354 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1974). 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 248–55. 
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the judgment’s preclusive effect. Collateral attack might be at least as 
necessary here as it is in class actions.277  
Why is it that beneficiaries have not participated in common trust 
fund accountings, when intervening class members—or rather, their 
lawyers—have played such an important role in challenging class action 
settlements? It could be that there is not all that much to challenge in 
trust fund accountings. After all, the trustee of a common trust fund does 
little beyond keeping the books and investing the money, presumably in 
a well-balanced and somewhat conservative portfolio. But it is also true 
that trust fund accountings offer no pot of gold to challengers or their 
lawyers, especially since New York does not recognize the common fund 
attorney fee doctrine.278 As is now generally recognized, financial 
incentives play a vital role in explaining the behavior of both class 
lawyers and those representing intervenors. 
So ultimately the lesson of Mullane for those interested either in 
common trust funds or in notice or in class actions may be: follow the 
money and the lawyers, not the procedures. New York bankers sought a 
res judicata bath for their common trust funds, while those in other states 
did not, but both approaches turned out to shield banks from liability in 
almost all instances. The original New York statute contained only 
derisory provisions for notice, while after Mullane more was required; 
but again, there was little real difference in the results. Yet from these 
contexts in which procedural choices meant little, there grew a principle 
that means a lot: that one can cut off the claims of thousands of 
nonparticipating people in a proceeding, but only if notice by mail goes 
to those whose addresses are known. More than sixty years later, that 
principle is still very much with us, for good and for ill.  
 
 
 277. For one view of the collateral attack issue, see William B. Rubinstein, Finality in Class Action 
Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2007). 
 278. Flemming v. Barnwell Nursing Home & Health Facilities, Inc., 938 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 2010). 
Those appointed like Mullane as special guardians and attorneys did of course receive fees. See supra 
Part III.B. 
